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When people lack jobs, opportunity, and ownership of property they have 
little or no stake in their communities.1 
  —Jack Kemp 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Intangible digital goods should be traded under similar terms as tangible 
goods because without the protections given to physical property, consumers 
engaging in digital property transactions are at a significant disadvantage, 
compared to only a few decades ago.2 For the past several decades, contracts of 
 
* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May, 2014; B.A., Political 
Science, University of California, Davis, 2011. I wish to thank my loved ones for their encouragement and 
support. I am also extremely grateful to Professor John Sprankling for his wonderful guidance throughout the 
writing of this comment. 
1. Committee Endorsed Candidates, HENRIETTA REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE CANDIDATES, http://www. 
henriettarepublican.com/candidates.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2013). 
2. See generally R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44 B.C. L. 
Rev. 577 (2003); see generally Dimitri Konstantas, Trading Digital Intangible Goods: The Rules of the Game 1, 
available at http://asg.unige.ch/site/papers/KoMo00a.pdf. 
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adhesion have become the primary force in the transfer of digital property.3 These 
are unilateral contracts between parties on a “take-it-or-leave-it-basis.”4 Typical 
contracts of adhesion define digital property transfers as merely a license5 and 
attempt to strip all other rights from the end user by restricting their ability to 
reproduce, reuse, or transfer property.6 This is entirely unique and distinct from 
all other forms of property ownership.7 For example, a traditional book may be 
lawfully resold without prior consent from the copyright owner and its 
intellectual content may be reused under the fair use doctrine, which permits 
limited use of the material without acquiring permission from the owner.8 
However, an electronic book does not adhere to the same instruments of 
copyright law.9 Contracts of adhesion prevent resale of the electronic book 
because the sold content is classified as a license; the original distributor retains 
ownership of the digital data and tyrannically dictates restrictive measures for the 
licensee.10 These doctrines have grown so expansively that distributors are 
attempting to apply these restrictive measures to not just digital property, but 
physical personal property as well.11 The current system of digital property 
transfer disenfranchises consumers and inevitably creates a monopoly on the 
distribution of digital materials, since only the original distributer retains the right 
to sell.12 
The best solution to this problem is to allow the first sale doctrine to 
permeate the veil of contracts of adhesion when dealing with digital 
transactions.13 The first sale doctrine allows lawful buyers to resell copyrighted 
materials.14 Thus, in the prior example of an electronic book, allowing the first 
sale doctrine to break the legal confines of contracts of adhesion would create 
 
3. Mo Zhang, Contractual Choice of Law in Contracts of Adhesion and Party Autonomy, 41 AKRON L. 
REV. 123, 145 (2008). 
4. See id. at 123.  
5. See Christopher B. Yeh, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: B. COPYRIGHT: 1. Note: Wall Data Inc. v. 
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department: License Versus Sale At the Crossroads of Contract and Copyright, 
22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 355, 357 (2007). 
6. See Reese, supra note 2, at 578. 
7. See Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, 56 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 381, 392 (2005). 
8. Id.; Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2005). See Davidson & Assocs. v. Internet 
Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1181 (E.D. Mo. 2004) (Court held users waived their fair use defense by 
accepting a contract of adhesion); see also Ben Depoorter & Francesco Parisi, Fair Use and Copyright 
Protection: A Price Theory Explanation, 21 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 453, 454 (2002) (arguing that fair use is 
still valuable even in the digital context).  
9. Madison, supra note 7, at 392. See also Depoorter & Parisi, supra note 8, at 454. 
10. See Nancy S. Kim, The Software Licensing Dilemma, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1103, 1139 (2008). 
11. See Chris Kohler, Microsoft Will Let You Resell Xbox One Games–But Publishers May Not, 
WIRED.COM, (June 6, 2013, 6:39 PM), http://www.wired.com/gamelife/2013/06/xbox-one-used-games/. 
12. See Brian W. Carver, Why License Agreements Do Not Control Copy Ownership: First Sales and 
Essential Copies, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1887, 1889 (2010). 
13. See generally Reese, supra note 2. 
14. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); see also Reese, supra note 2, at 578. 
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parity in regards to the transferability between an electronic book and a physical 
book. Although European courts have started adopting this solution,15 the United 
States court system is still resistant.16 
This problematic legal imbalance, coupled with a consumer demand for used 
digital goods, has left a void that only a few companies have attempted to satisfy 
due to fear of copyright liability.17 In 2011, the sale of digital music surpassed the 
sale of physical shipments (CDs and vinyls).18 In an effort to recapture these 
digital sales, a new startup company, ReDigi, has been attempting to create a 
secondary used market for music files by scanning the metadata of a user’s music 
to determine if it was acquired legally.19 The program then deletes the music file 
and all copies from the user’s computer, and transfers a copy of the file to 
another willing buyer at a price determined by the buyer or the seller.20 
The goal of the process is to ensure only the buyer retains the sole music file 
after the sale.21 However, since copies are inevitably created in the process,22 U.S. 
courts are unlikely to allow first sale doctrine applicability.23 The first sale 
doctrine needs to be introduced into digital transactions, and one way to 
accomplish this is by expanding property ownership to individual digital goods.24 
This Comment examines the divergent relationship between contract law, 
copyright law, and property law when applied to tangible personal property as 
opposed to intangible digital property. Intangible digital property is defined as 
“digital representations of tangible goods.”25 The effect of the current state of 
U.S. law on digital property prevents end users from acquiring ownership of 
 
15. See Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp., 2012 E.C.R. para. 10 (July 3, 2012), 
available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=C-128/11&td=ALL. 
16. See generally Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004); 
see generally ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); see generally Hill v. Gateway 2000, 
Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); see generally Mudd-Lyman Sales & Serv. Corp. v. United Parcel Serv., 
Inc., 236 F. Supp. 2d 907 (N.D. Ill. 2002); see generally I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. 
Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2002). 
17. See Sarah Abelson, An Emerging Secondary Market for Digital Music, 29 WTR ENT. & SPORTS LAW 
8, 8-9 (Winter 2012). 
18. Chris C. Anderson, RIAA 2011 Year End Shipment Data Report: Digital Sales King, Physical Sales 
Continue Decline, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 28, 2012, 5:27 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/28/ 
riaa-2011-sales-data-digital_n_1386098.html. 
19. Abelson, supra note 17, at 8-9; see also Sage Vanden Heuvel, Fighting the First Sale Doctrine: 
Strategies for a Struggling Film Industry, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 661, 670 (2012). 
20. Abelson supra note 17, at 8; see also Vanden Heuvel, supra note 19, at 670. 
21. Abelson, supra note 17, at 11; see also Vanden Heuvel, supra note 19, at 670.  
22. See infra Part II. 
23. See generally Henry Sprott Long III, Reconsidering the Balance of the Digital First Sale Debate: Re-
Examining the Case for a Statutory Digital First Sale Doctrine to Facilitate Second-Hand Digital Media 
Markets, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1183, 1184 (2008) (discussing rights afforded to consumers under the first sale 
doctrine with tangible media is missing with identical digital media). 
24. See infra Parts II-V. 
25. Konstantas, supra note 2, at 1.  
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digital property due to its heavy reliance on contracts of adhesion.26 As intangible 
digital property consumption increases in comparison to tangible property 
consumption, consumers will inevitably be unable to transfer digital goods 
because legal fictions have overwhelmed real world needs.27 United States courts 
should treat intangible digital property with the same care tangible property has 
been given, by allowing the first sale doctrine to enter into digital transactions 
regardless of restrictive contract of adhesion terms. 
Section II of this comment gives a brief history of digital property 
protection.28 Section III of this comment will address the role contracts of 
adhesion play in digital transfers, along with their strengths and weaknesses.29 
Overall, the court’s repeated acquiescence to modern contracts of adhesion 
prevents end user protection.30 For example, the first sale doctrine has become 
inaccessible to consumers and allows distributors of digital property to impose 
“take-it-or-leave-it”31 contractual terms creating a monopoly on digital goods.32 
Section IV of this comment identifies the balancing role that the first sale 
doctrine plays in other property aspects, and additionally argues that the first sale 
doctrine should play a vital role in future transfers of digital goods.33 Section V of 
this comment illustrates the European attempt to apply the first sale doctrine in 
digital transfers and the need for United States courts to join the same rationale.34 
Failure to do so erodes the Anglo-American legal tradition of ownership of 
property by the legal fiction of contracts of adhesion.35 Thus, intangible digital 
goods should be traded under similar terms as tangible goods because without the 
protections of physical property, consumers engaging in digital property 
transactions are at a significant disadvantage.36 
  
 
26. See generally Carver, supra note 12 (illustrating the problem with allowing copyright owners to use 
end user licenses). 
27. Glenn Peoples, Digital Sales Up 10% Over January 2012, BILLBOARD (Jan. 31, 2013, 7:00 AM), 
http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/digital-and-mobile/1536343/digital-sales-up-10-over-january-2012 
(discussing the continued increase in digital music sales); see Brenna Hillier, NPD: Digital sales up 17%, not 
enough to reverse industry decline, VG24/7 (Aug. 8, 2012, 11:44 PM), http://www.vg247.com/2012/08/08/npd-
digital-sales-up-17-not-enough-to-reverse-industry-decline/ (steady increase in digital video game sales). 
28. See infra Part II. 
29. See infra Parts III.A-B. 
30. See infra Parts III.A-B. 
31. Zhang, supra note 3, at 123. 
32. See Carver, supra note 12, at 1889 (arguing potential monopoly issues when copy owners use end 
user licenses). 
33. See infra Parts IV.A-C. 
34. See infra Parts V.A-B. 
35. See infra Part IV.A. 
36. See infra Parts II-VI. 
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II. DIGITAL PROPERTY HISTORY 
Currently, the law allows tangible personal property the protections of the 
first sale doctrine, while the same content in intangible digital form is stripped of 
these rights.37 This disparity emerged because historically, digital products have 
not been seen under property law as “things” like books, machines, or other 
tangible items.38 
In U.S. criminal law, digital property is not included in crimes such as 
larceny because it is not a “material object or movement of power” and thus did 
not fulfill the rigid definition of property.39 Instead of widening the scope of 
property law to encompass intangible digital property, federal legislatures 
enacted new and distinct legislation to protect digital mediums from theft, 
trespass, and other virtual crimes.40 This shift led to the current laws regulating 
digital property, which prevent transferability of digital goods through the use of 
contracts of adhesion41 and fall short of the accepted norms of tangible property.42 
The 21st century has seen a massive transfer of traditional physical mediums 
such as books, music, and entertainment converted into completely digital 
forms.43 This presents many challenges for owners to display first sale doctrine 
defenses because unintended copies are inevitably being created.44 “[A] user’s 
 
37. See infra Parts III-IV. 
38. Madison, supra note 7, at 462. 
39. Moonho Song & Carrie Leonetti, The Protection of Digital Information and Prevention of its 
Unauthorized Access and Use in Criminal Law, 28 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 523, 526 (2011). See 
generally Susan W. Brenner, Nanocrime?, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 39, 71 (2011) (discussing the 
complexities of rigid definitions of property crimes which cannot easily adapt to rapid changes in technological 
advancements). 
40. Song & Leonetti, supra note 39, at 523-24; see also ALA. CODE § 13A-8-1(10) (1994) (intangible 
property included in definition of property); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1801(A)(12) (2001) 
(“‘[p]roperty’ means anything of value, tangible or intangible, including trade secrets.”); see also ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 5-36-101(7) (2003); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.012(4)(b) (West 2005); see also ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 352(1)(B) (1983); see also MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 556.063(13), 570.010(10) (West 2012); see 
also MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(61)(k) (West 2003); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-509(5) (West 1995); see 
also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 637:2(I) (1996); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-1(g) (West 2004); see 
also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-12(F) (West 2004); see also OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.005(5) (West 2003); see 
also tit. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3901 (West 2007); see also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-1-2(35) (2003); see 
also TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-106(a)(28) (West 2003); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.01(5)(B) (West 
2004-2005); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-401(1) (West 2003); see also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-
104(a)(viii) (2003) (defining property as anything of value as opposed to a material object). See generally Marc 
D. Goodman & Susan W. Brenner, The Emerging Consensus on Criminal Conduct in Cyberspace, 6 UCLA J.L. 
& TECH. 1 (2002).  
41. See Carver, supra note 12, at 1915 (explaining the Economic Realities Approach and Perpetual 
Possession Approach). 
42. See Song & Leonetti, supra note 39, at 525. 
43. Sulin Ba et al., Small Companies in the Digital Economy, in UNDERSTANDING THE DIGITAL 
ECONOMY: DATA, TOOLS, AND RESEARCH 185, 187 (Erik Brynjolfsoon & Brian Kahin eds., 2002). See 
Consumers are Buying Digital Goods in New Ways, INTERNET RETAILER (May 28, 2010, 2:04 PM), 
http://www. internetretailer.com/2010/05/28/consumers-are-buying-digital-goods-new-ways.  
44. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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computer will automatically copy software into the computer’s random access 
memory (‘RAM’), which is a form of data storage.”45 
Simply uploading or downloading can make multiple copies.46 For example, 
items required for the user to perceive and interact with the file when 
downloading such as, modems, routers, web browsers, video decompression 
chips, and display boards all create unintended copies as the computer 
manipulates the electronic signal of the file and converts it into a visual 
representation on a computer screen.47 This is why Congress enacted the essential 
step defense48 to allow software users who are “owner[s] of a copy” of a software 
program to make these copies that inevitably occur via tasks required to run the 
software, such as installation.49 Yet, Congress has not acted to allow users the 
ability to become owners of the software, which is a necessary requirement to use 
the first sale doctrine.50 As a result, consumers of these digital medium have lost 
protections once afforded to them under traditional physical mediums51 and have 
undue copyright liability placed upon them.52 
Previously, physical mediums, such as a book, had three doctrines regulating 
its use and sale.53 First, common law property rights instilled ownership upon the 
rightful buyer’s personal property.54 Second, copyright law protected the original 
creator of the work by preventing use or copy of the intellectual properties 
contained within the book.55 Finally, the first sale doctrine allowed resale of the 
book by the buyer even though it was copyrighted.56 
Yet, since property is limited to a “material object or movement of power,” 
electronic symbols created via a computer are not considered property.57 Thus, 
when one constructs a document on the computer, they own only the intangible 
copyright associated with that work of authorship and have no common law 
property rights in the digital file, only a copyright to the file.58 However, when 
 
45. Id. 
46. Mark A. Lemley, Copyright Owners’ Rights and Users’ Privileges on the Internet: Dealing with 
Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 DAYTON L. REV. 547, 555 (1997). 
47. Id. 
48. 17 U.S.C.A. § 117 (1998). 
49. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1109. 
50. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir.1993) (customers were licensees who 
were not entitled to claim the essential step defense). See Triad Sys. Corp v. Se. Exp. Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th 
Cir. 1995). See Reese, supra note 2, at 578 (mentioning the “wait and see approach” taken by Congress).  
51. See Reese, supra note 2, at 610-15 (discussing digital networks and technological protection 
measures). 
52. Lemley, supra note 46, at 555; Alfred C. Yen, Entrepreneurship, Copyright, and Personal Home 
Pages, 75 OR. L. REV. 331, 333-34 (1996). 
53. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 348-49 (1908). 
54. Madison, supra note 7, at 392; see also Depoorter & Parisi, supra note 8, at 454. 
55. See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
56. Reese, supra note 2, at 577. 
57. Song & Leonetti, supra note 39, at 526. 
58. See Adobe Sys. v. Stargate Software, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
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compared with someone who wrote the same document on a piece of paper, this 
author owns the copyright attributed to that work of authorship and has common 
law property rights in the paper itself.59 This result gives the digital author 
tremendous power because the supply of his work will be smaller in the digital 
realm, since his work can never be resold or transferred under the first sale 
doctrine.60 This creates a situation in which the intangible buyer is at a 
tremendous disadvantage because there is no secondary market to drive prices 
down.61 
Even if the digital file was considered tangible property, contracts of 
adhesion typically prevent ownership of an electronic book by classifying it as a 
lease, which precludes the first sale doctrine because the buyer does not actually 
own anything.62 In order to gain parity between digital goods and tangible goods, 
the first sale doctrine, along with digital ownership and bars to restraints of 
alienation of digital property, are necessary. 
Without the protections of physical property, consumers engaging in digital 
property transactions are at a significant disadvantage when compared to a few 
decades earlier.63 Intangible digital goods can and should be traded under similar 
terms as tangible goods.64 
III. CONTRACTS OF ADHESION 
In order to transfer intangible digital property, consumers must overcome the 
use of standard license terms commonly referred to as contracts of adhesion, 
which restrict the transfer of digital property.65 This can be accomplished by 
allowing the first sale doctrine to overwrite any restriction on transferability.66 
Almost all exchanges of digital property are accompanied by a contract of 
adhesion in the form of an end user license agreement.67 A contract of adhesion is 
a contract between two parties where the terms and conditions of the contract are 
set by one party, and the other party is placed in a “take-it-or-leave-it” position 
with little or no ability to negotiate more favorable terms.68 Traditional contracts 
 
59. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1908). 
60. Reese, supra note 2, at 578. 
61. Id. at 625-26. 
62. See Adobe Sys., 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1052 (providing an example of the buyer owning the CD-ROM but 
not the software because of an agreement). 
63. Reese, supra note 2, at 610, 612. 
64. Konstantas, supra note 2, at 9-10. 
65. Zhang, supra note 3, at 146. 
66. See generally Reese, supra note 2. 
67. Michael E. Kenneally, Commandeering Copyright, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1179, 1180 (2012). 
68. Zhang, supra note 3, at 124-25.  
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require a multilateral meeting of the minds between parties, whereas an adhesion 
contract can infer assent to unilateral terms.69 
Courts have grappled heavily with enforcing contracts of adhesion due to 
unfairness among the negotiating parties.70 Overall, most U.S. courts reject claims 
that a party lacked assent by failing to read the terms71 and have found that the 
role of contracts of adhesion in promoting economic efficiency and reducing 
transaction costs outweighs the potential for inefficient and unjust terms.72 
Three distinct but legally similar contracts of adhesion have arisen: shrink-
wrap, click-wrap, and browse wrap agreements.73 Shrink-wrap agreements are 
typically imposed in the retail of physical software packages containing written 
license agreements that become effective as soon as the customer removes the 
wrapping from the package.74 Click-wrap agreements usually dictate E-commerce 
transactions on the internet by which a party may assent by clicking “I agree” or 
typing a specified set of words.75 Browse-wrap agreements are electronic form 
agreements provided on a website where users can examine the terms without 
expressly agreeing to them.76 Even though the party has not assented by clicking 
“I agree,” the user’s assent is assumed in browse-wrap agreements when the user 
performs certain actions such as software installation.77 Today, users agree to 
multiple types of contracts of adhesion on an almost daily basis.78 
 
69. See id. at 123. 
70. Courts that have found these types of licenses invalid characterize them as contracts of adhesion that 
are unacceptable. Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000). However, other courts have 
held that these types of licenses are valid and enforceable contracts. See generally ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 
86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Hill, 105 F.3d 1147; see generally Mudd-Lyman Sales & Serv. Corp. v. United 
Parcel Serv., Inc., 236 F. Supp. 2d 907, 911-12 (N.D. Ill. 2002); see generally I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. 
Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2002). 
71. Stanley A. Klopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co., 510 F. Supp. 807, 811 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Schillachi v. Flying 
Dutchman Motorcycle Club, 751 F. Supp. 1169, 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (quoting 8 PENNSYLVANIA LAW 
ENCYCLOPEDIA § 83: “[i]t is common sense and an accepted rule of law that a person has a duty to read the 
contract before executing it, and his failure to do so will not excuse his ignorance of the contents.”). See Univ. 
of Miami v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 166 F.App’x 450, 453 (11th Cir. 2006) (failing to read the contract is no 
excuse); see also Torrance v. Aames Funding Corp., 242 F. Supp. 2d 862, 869 (D. Or. 2002) (explaining that 
consumers do have a responsibility to read their contracts and a mere failure to read is not a valid defense to 
contract formation). 
72. Meridian Project Sys. v. Hardin Constr. Co., LLC, 426 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1107 (E.D. Cal. 2006); see 
also ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451. 
73. Zhang, supra note 3, at 125-26.  
74. Id. at 126; see also ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449. 
75. Zhang, supra note 3, at 124-25; see also Christina L. Kunz et al., Click-Through Agreements: 
Strategies for Avoiding Disputes on Validity of Assent, 57 BUS. LAW. 401 (2001); see also Cheryl B. Preston & 
Eli W. McCann, Unwrapping Shrinkwraps, Clickwraps, and Browsewraps: How the Law Went Wrong from 
Horse Traders to the Law of the Horse, 26 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 17-18 (2011). 
76. Kunz et al., supra note 75, at 401.  
77. Zhang, supra note 3, at 125-26; see also Preston & McCann, supra note 75, at 18. 
78. Kenneally, supra note 67, at 1180.  
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A. Benefits of Contracts of Adhesion 
Proponents for contracts of adhesion stress their ability to attain market 
efficiency.79 The theory relies upon the assumption that quick contracts and loose 
requirements directly promote economic efficiency because they reduce 
transaction costs between parties.80 As a result, courts refrain from putting 
pressure on contract drafters to produce balanced contractual terms among the 
parties because, in a competitive market, consumers can pay more for better 
terms.81 
Under this theory, sellers have little incentive to take advantage of the buyer 
because they risk lowering their reputation.82 In addition, the buyer does not incur 
the risk of reputation loss because, in a competitive market, the buyer can seek 
other available distributors.83 As a result, the appearance of one-sided terms may 
not be one-sided after all.84 The seller’s reputational considerations and 
disinclinations to sue consumers are a significant cost for the seller and, as a 
result, the seller behaves in the consumer’s best interests.85 
Another rationale is that competitive markets force sellers to accommodate 
buyers.86 Competitive markets allow contracts of adhesion to afford better terms 
to buyers because sellers can charge a higher price for the more favorable terms.87 
However, in many situations, digital goods are equal to or more expensive than 
their physical counterparts.88 Despite lower production, manufacturing, shipping, 
and marketing costs, the cost of entertainment has not gone down in the past 
thirty years.89 In addition, Apple was found violating the Sherman Antitrust Act 
by fixing prices of its Ebooks at unlawfully high prices in order to increase 
revenue.90 These actions are clearly contradictory to what is in the best interests 
 
79. See Preston & McCann, supra note 75, at 12. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 
104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 830 (2006). 
83. See generally id. 
84. See generally Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 82. 
85. Id.  
86. See id. at 830.  
87. Id. at 833. 
88. E-Book Readers Face Sticker Shock, THE WALL ST. J. (Dec. 15, 2011, 1:08 PM), http:// 
online.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424052970204336104577096762173802678-lMyQjAxMTAxMDEwNT 
ExNDUyWj.html?mod=e2tw#articleTabs%3Darticle. 
89. Scott Monkman, Corporate Erosion of Fair Use: Global Copyright Law Regarding File Sharing, 6 
ASPER REV. INT’L BUS & TRADE L. 265, 280 (2006). 
90. United States v. Apple Inc., No. 12 Civ. 2826, 2013 WL 3454986, at 59 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2013) 
(ruling that Apple conspired to restrain trade by fixing prices in violation of Section of the Sherman Antitrust 
Act).  
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of the consumer and, without other methods to lower the price, such as secondary 
markets, the consumer has no option but to accept these inflated prices.91 
B. Drawbacks of Contracts of Adhesion 
The major flaw with using reputational considerations as a basis for party 
equality is that consumers are ill-informed about the behavior of sellers.92 The 
burden of becoming informed and digesting the lengthy and cumbersome 
legalese of online contracts of adhesion is a significant cost imposed upon the 
consumer.93 As a result, buyers engage in rational ignorance because the cost of 
acquiring full knowledge is outweighed by the desire to complete the transaction 
promptly.94 Since consumers are ill-informed about sellers, sellers rarely incur 
reputational costs and can take advantage of the consumer via unfair contractual 
terms restricting use and transfer.95 
Even more troubling, many contracts that attempt to assert legal rights on 
behalf of the distributer frequently contain outright misrepresentations.96 For 
example, various publishers require permission and compensation for the works 
of William Shakespeare, Henry David Thoreau’s “Walden” (1854), Charles 
Darwin’s “The Expression of the Emotions of Man and Animals” (1872), or Jane 
Austen’s “Sense and Sensibility” (1811).97 These works are without a doubt in 
the public domain and require no permissions to recreate.98 Distributers engage in 
these actions to discourage economic competition, resulting in increased costs 
and restrictions on legitimate fair use rights.99 
Many terms in contracts of adhesion are in fact unfair, onerous, and 
overreaching, but are nonetheless allowed by courts because they do not reach 
the standard of unconscionability.100 Unconscionability can be satisfied by a 
 
91. See generally Dan Moren, The Apple Ebook Price-Fixing Suit: What it All Means, MACWORLD (June 
3, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://www.macworld.com/article/2040598/the-apple-ebook-price-fixing-suit-what-it-all-
means.html. 
92. Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 82, at 832. 
93. See id. 
94. See id. 
95. See id. at 830, 832. 
96. John Tehranian, Curbing Copyblight, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 993, 994-95 (2012); see also 
Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1026, 1076 (2006). 
97. Tehranian, supra note 96, at 1003. 
98. See Peter B. Hirtle, Recent Changes To The Copyright Law: Copyright Term Extension, ARCHIVAL 
OUTLOOK (Jan./Feb. 1999), available at http://copyright.cornell.edu/resources/publicdomain.cfm. 
99. See Tehranian, supra note 96, at 995. 
100. See Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 605 (reasoning that unconscionability is 
not determined on its face but rather alongside an inquiry into the circumstances under which a contract was 
executed). See generally Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 82, at 829. But see Galligan v. Arovitch, 219 A.2d 463, 
465 (Pa. 1966) (finding a contract of adhesion unconscionable for unfair bargaining); but see also Sosa v. 
Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 364 (Utah 1996) (finding a contract of adhesion unconscionable for unfair bargaining); 
but see also State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 284-85 (W. Va. 2002) (finding a contract of 
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showing of substantively “overly harsh or one-sided results” and procedural 
oppression through unequal bargaining or “surprise through hidden terms.”101 Of 
particular concern are terms that restrict transferability in regards to rights of 
survivorship.102 One example is restrictions that grant online service providers the 
right to permanently delete accounts that breach a term of service, which in the 
process deletes all associated documents and correspondence.103 Many users do 
not want information about banking accounts, business transactions, reservations, 
schedules, or similar critical information being deleted under the sole discretion 
of another.104 Similarly, many may be shocked to discover that upon the death of 
a spouse, partner, or employer, a service provider can delete or withhold all 
content created by the decedent.105 Copyright law would be of no avail because it 
does not include a right to prevent the destruction of a copy lawfully obtained; 
only common law property rights could protect the user.106 
IV. THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE 
The first sale doctrine in U.S. copyright law limits the exclusive right of the 
copyright owner to distribute copies of the copyrighted work by allowing those 
who buy copies of copyrighted works to resell those copies.107 The first sale 
doctrine is a doctrine in copyright law that hearkens back to the law’s historic 
disfavor of restraints on the alienation of personal property.108 As a result, one 
who owns a copy of a copyrighted work may resell the copy or give it away.109 
However, the first sale doctrine is unavailable to digital property consumers 
 
adhesion unconscionable for unfair bargaining); but see also Pittsfield Weaving Co. v. Grove Textiles, Inc., 430 
A.2d 638, 640 (N.H. 1981) (finding a contract of adhesion unconscionable for unfair bargaining). 
101. Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 605. 
102. See Tyler G. Tarney, A Call for Legislation to Permit the Transfer of Digital Assets at Death, 40 
CAP. U. L. REV. 773, 796 (2012). 
103. Preston & McCann, supra note 75, at 12. 
104. Id. 
105. See James D. Lamm, Digital Property: Planning for Incapacity and Death, GRAY PLANT MOOTY 4 
(June 7, 2010), available at http://www.gpmlaw.com/uploadedFiles/Resources/Articles/Digital_Property 
_Planning_for_Incapacity_and_Death.pdf. See generally, e.g., Brandon Giggs, Can Bruce Willis leave his 
iTunes music to his kids?, CNN (Sept. 4, 2012, 5:34 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/03/tech/web/bruce-
willis-itunes/index.html?hpt=hp_c2 (asserting that famous actor Bruce Willis was not able to bequeath his 
songs on iTunes because when he purchased the music, he agreed to iTunes’ terms not to do so); see generally, 
e.g., Becky Yerak, Online Accounts After Death: Remember Digital Property When Listing Assets, CHICAGO 
TRIBUNE (Aug. 26, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-08-26/business/ct-biz-0826-digital-assets—
20120826_1_online-accounts-digital-assets-digital-property (identifying that Yahoo’s terms of service does not 
allow a right of survivorship or transferability in regard to its user’s account).  
106. See Tarney, supra note 102, at 784. 
107. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); Reese, supra note 2, at 580-81.  
108. Reese, supra note 2, at 580-81. 
109. Id. 
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because contracts of adhesion limit the exchange to a lease, precluding ownership 
of the digital property.110 
A. Real Property 
The right to transfer property, specifically real property, is a cornerstone of 
the U.S. legal system.111 Even though the first sale doctrine does not apply to real 
property, there lies a historic disfavor toward restraints on alienability within real 
property transactions.112 The U.S. property system specifically rejects feudalism, 
which restricted real property ownership, as a way of life.113 This rejection of 
feudalism is illustrated in common law doctrines restricting the restraint on 
alienation of property in favor of more efficient, free market methods of property 
allocation.114 
Ownership under feudalism was hierarchical rather than dispersed among 
equal persons.115 No one was a true “owner” except the King.116 Lords had the 
power to control the terms on which others were allowed access to the lords’ 
lands.117 Today, landlords still exist, but their powers over tenants are more 
limited.118 For example, landlords cannot force tenants to engage in actions 
against the tenant’s will or restrict access from the tenants.119 In a way, the 
relationships between online digital distributors and users mentioned above 
resemble a feudalistic landlord-tenant relationship.120 
“A necessary consequence of . . . a democratic way of life is that . . . some 
contractual terms must be outlawed and placed out of bounds.”121 Unfortunately, 
the current state of digital property transfer echoes the feudalistic approach to 
property rights.122 Until contractual terms regulating all digital property transfers 
 
110. See infra Part IV.C. 
111. JOHN G. SPRANKLING & RAYMOND R. COLETTA, PROPERTY: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 27 (1st 
ed. 2009). 
112. See Kim, supra note 10, at 1111. See generally Joseph William Singer, Property Law as the 
Infrastructure of Democracy: The Fourth Wolf Family Lecture on the American Law of Real Property (2011), 
available at http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic150416.files/ID.pdf. 
113. Singer, supra note 112, at 6.  
114. See, e.g., Reese, supra note 2, at 595. 
115. Singer, supra note 112, at 3. 
116. See id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. See State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971) (court ruled that real property owners are not 
entitled to prevent service workers funded by the federal government from getting access to workers living on 
the owner’s land). 
120. See supra Part II. 
121. Singer, supra note 112, at 6 (2011). See generally Brief of Appellant, Vernon v. Autodesk, Inc., No. 
09-35969 (9th Cir. Feb. 26, 2010), 2010 WL 894738 (claiming the first sale doctrine serves a critical 
democratic value by striking a balance with copyright law). 
122. See Reese, supra note 2, at 610-12. 
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as leases are reexamined, the feudalistic state of affairs will persist among digital 
property.123 As digital transactions continue to increase, it will become more 
apparent that digital goods should be treated similarly to tangible goods.124 Even 
today, the line between physical real property and digital real property is 
blurring125 and the first sale doctrine would allow consumers to escape the pitfalls 
of a feudalistic digital era.126 
B. Personal Property 
Personal property is afforded more protection than digital property under the 
law.127 Tangible personal property includes all tangible movable property.128 
Intangible personal property includes shares of stocks and intellectual property 
such as copyrights, patents, and trademarks.129 The main issue in determining a 
valid transfer of personal property under the first sale doctrine is whether the 
transferee lawfully attained ownership.130 
United States courts have had many conflicts between the first sale doctrine 
and contracts of adhesion.131 One such instance involved a company sending 
promotional CDs of its copyrighted songs to music industry insiders to advertise 
and promote sales.132 The promotional CDs’ label stated: 
This CD is the property of the record company and is licensed to the 
intended recipient for personal use only. Acceptance of this CD shall 
constitute an agreement to comply with the terms of the license. Resale 
or transfer of possession is not allowed and may be punishable under 
federal and state laws.133 
The music company intended this to be a shrink-wrap agreement in which 
the music insiders could have declined assent by returning the CDs.134 As a result, 
the music company sued Troy Augusto for violating the terms of the agreement 
when he sold physical copies of the CDs acquired from music industry insiders.135 
 
123. See generally id. 
124. See supra Part I. 
125. See Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 596-97 (PLaintiff contended that operators of the game Second Life 
unlawfully confiscated plaintiff’s virtual property and denied access to his property).  
126. See infra Part IV. 
127. See supra Part I. 
128. See, e.g., SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 111, at 161. 
129. Id. at 236. 
130. See supra Part I. 
131. See Meridian Project Sys., 426 F. Supp. 2d at 1106. 
132. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1058, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
133. Id. at 1058. 
134. See id. 
135. See id. 
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However, the court held that this type of transaction should be categorized as a 
gift or sale, and not as a license.136 The categorization as a sale is important 
because the court abandoned the contract of adhesion language categorizing the 
transaction as a “license.”137 This afforded the industry insiders protection under 
the first sale doctrine because the sale classification meant that a transfer of 
ownership had occurred.138 
C. Digital Property 
“Only those who are ‘owners’ of a copy” are able to exercise the rights of 
transfer under the first sale doctrine.139 Due to the invasiveness of contracts of 
adhesion throughout digital property transfers,140 copyright owners’ ability to 
restrict a transfer is only limited “by the imaginativeness of their end-user license 
agreements (‘EULAs’).”141 
The invasiveness of EULAs, as a form of click-wrap contracts, illustrates the 
law’s divergent and discriminatory approach to digital property in comparison to 
other forms of property.142 One such EULA agreement involved Adobe, a 
software development and publishing company, selling educational versions of 
its software for students and educators at a discount.143 Even though the software 
was contained on a CD-ROM, the court determined that the consumer ultimately 
paid for “the software contained on the CD-ROM, rather than the CD-ROM 
itself,” thus making it a transfer of intangible digital property.144 The defendant 
distributor claimed “it was the rightful owner of the software products and 
therefore did not infringe” the software maker’s copyright by digitally “reselling 
those products, pursuant to the first sale doctrine.”145 The court held that the end 
user license agreement146 contained numerous restrictions on title that were 
imposed on the reseller, which limited the reseller’s ability to re-distribute the 
 
136. Id. at 1061-62. 
137. See id. at 1064. 
138. UMG Recordings, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 1064. 
139. Carver, supra note 12, at 1889. 
140. See Zhang, supra note 3, at 146 (reporting that today, the great majority of contracts are standard 
form contracts, especially in consumer, business and electronic transactions). 
141. Carver, supra note 12, at 1889. 
142. See id. at 1896-97 (arguing that in cases of software sales, unlike tangible property sales, too many 
courts incorrectly rely only on the language of the agreement to hold that the recipient possesses a “license” 
even if the software had been permanently transferred to the recipient). 
143. Adobe Sys., 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1052. 
144. Id. at 1055. 
145. Id. at 1053. 
146. Id. at 1059 (the EULA stated: “‘THIS IS A CONTRACT. BY OPENING THIS PACKAGE YOU 
ACCEPT ALL THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT . . . .This package contains 
software (‘Software’) and related explanatory written materials (‘Documentation’) . . . . Adobe grants to you a 
nonexclusive license to use the Software and Documentation, provided that you agree to the following . . . .The 
Software is owned by Adobe and its suppliers.’”).  
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software, and thereby conferred a license between the software maker and the 
reseller.147 
The Adobe Systems case is strikingly similar to UMG Recordings in that a 
contract of adhesion preventing resale was in place and the defendants violated 
that clause, yet the cases reached two completely different outcomes in the user’s 
ability to transfer.148 By comparing UMG and Adobe, it is quite clear that the 
primary distinction to determine whether contracts of adhesion or the first sale 
doctrine should control is whether the property is classified as tangible personal 
property or intangible digital property.149 UMG Recordings specifically dealt with 
a physical CD being exchanged, whereas Adobe Systems only examined the 
intangible digital software.150 
Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. expands the holding in UMG Recordings to apply to 
everyday office sales.151 Vernor bought copies of Autodesk, a form of computer 
design software, at an office sale and listed four copies on eBay for sale.152 When 
Autodesk petitioned eBay to remove the sales, Vernor sought a declaratory 
judgment to establish that the sale of the software was protected by the first sale 
doctrine and did not infringe Autodesk’s copyright.153 The court considered three 
factors: (1) whether the copyright owner specified the software as a license, (2) 
whether the copyright owner significantly restricted the user’s ability to transfer, 
and (3) whether the copyright owner restricted the user’s ability to transfer the 
software.154 The court reluctantly concluded that Vernor was not an owner of the 
software, noting that Congress is free “to modify the first sale doctrine and the 
essential step defense if it deems these or other policy considerations to require a 
different approach.”155 As a result, tangible personal property receives first sale 
protection, whereas intangible digital property receives no protection under the 
federal court system.156 
V. ALTERNATIVE TO THE CURRENT DIGITAL PROPERTY SYSTEM 
The current law surrounding the transfer of digital property relies heavily 
upon contracts of adhesion.157 This allows many benefits such as efficiency 
 
147. Id. at 1060. 
148. Compare id., with UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1055 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
149. Compare Adobe Sys., 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1060, with UMG Recordings, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 1064. 
150. UMG Recordings, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 1064; Adobe Sys., 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1055.  
151. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1105, 1111 (9th Circuit 2010). 
152. Id. at 1105. 
153. Id. at 1106. 
154. Id. at 1110-11. 
155. Id. at 1115. 
156. See supra Parts IV.B-C. 
157. See Zhang, supra note 3, at 145 (reporting that today, the great majority of contracts are standard 
form contracts, especially in consumer, business, and electronic transactions). 
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among the parties.158 However, as stated above, the current effect of the system 
prevents the spread and disbursement of digital property by eliminating 
secondary markets.159 The American property system’s historic disfavor of 
restrictions on alienability and its overall desire to make property accessible to 
the masses outweighs the perceived efficiency of the current system.160 For these 
reasons, the following section will offer an avenue for the courts to take in order 
to establish a fair and equitable system of digital property ownership and transfer. 
A. European Court of Justice 
A more equitable and efficient alternative to the current digital property 
transfer system can be found in decisions by the European Court of Justice 
(“ECJ”).161 The ECJ has ruled that the right of software developers to 
control distribution of a specific piece of software is exhausted once the software 
developer has been paid.162 According to the court, it makes no difference 
whether the copy of the computer program was made available by means of a 
download or on a DVD/CD-ROM.163 In addition, the software developer cannot 
prohibit distribution of second-hand sale.164 Such distribution may not be 
prohibited by contract, in particular by using EULAs.165 
However, the ECJ made it clear that an original acquirer of a tangible or 
intangible copy of a computer program, for which the copyright holder’s right of 
distribution is exhausted, must make the copy downloaded onto his own 
computer unusable at the time of resale.166 If the digital good continued to be in 
use, it would infringe the copyright holder’s exclusive right to reproduce the 
computer program.167 In contrast to the exclusive right of distribution, the 
exclusive right of reproduction is not exhausted by the first sale doctrine.168 In 
this context, the ECJ also pointed out that the copyright holder may use technical 
protective measures, such as product keys, in order to make sure that the original 
acquirer of the software in fact makes the copy unusable.169 The decision may 
allow the Redigi170 business model to take root in the European market.171 In 
 
158. Id. at 124. See supra Parts III.A-B. 
159. See supra Parts IV.A-C. 
160. SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 111, at 27. See Singer, supra note 112, at 3, 7-9.  
161. See generally Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp., 2012 E.C.R. (July 3, 2012), 
available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=C-128/11&td=ALL. 
162. Id. at para. 72. 
163. Id. at paras. 75, 79. 
164. Id. at paras. 76-77. 
165. Id. at paras. 76-77. 
166. See id. at paras. 70, 78. 
167. UsedSoft GmbH, 2012 E.C.R. at para. 70. 
168. Id. at para. 73. 
169. Id. at para. 79.  
170. Abelson, supra note 17, at 8-9. 
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effect, this decision restores balance between the seller and buyer because it 
allows the first sale doctrine to reenter the legal landscape by allowing digital 
works to be traded regardless of inadvertent copying.172 Implementation of this 
model could be accomplished with ease in courts in the United States.173 
Courts in the U.S. can escape the problems of the current system by adopting 
a modified multi-factor test pioneered by the ECJ, which balances the interests of 
the distributor and consumer equally.174 When a transaction involves a completely 
digital or intangible good, the court should ask whether a transfer of ownership 
has occurred by examining the type of product being sold (service versus good), 
the type of payment structure (one-time payment versus continued payments), 
and the length of use (indefinite versus temporary), while disregarding contract 
language stating ownership or lease.175 The United States Supreme Court has 
ruled that anticipatory arrangements via contract could not escape and change the 
actualities of what has occurred.176 Likewise, U.S. courts should be less 
deferential to the terms of the transaction and analyze what type of transfer has 
actually occurred.177 
Returning to the electronic book example, if a publisher sold a book to a 
student at a one-time fee for an indefinite period of time, the transaction would 
be categorized as a sale conferring ownership regardless of contract language 
stating otherwise.178 Similarly, the ECJ’s test allows this same result if the only 
difference in the transaction is that the sold book is downloaded or emailed 
instead of purchased in physical form.179 As a result, the student would be able to 
transfer that copy of the book to another student so long as all control of the book 
in possession is relinquished to only that one other student.180 This allows 
complete parity between digital transactions and tangible transactions.181 
The main difference between owning a tangible good and leasing a tangible 
good is illustrated by the product being sold, the type of payment, and the length 
of use.182 With these factors, any real world sale or intangible digital sale can be 
distinguished between ownership and lease.183 
 
171. Id. at 10.  
172. See supra Parts III-IV. 
173. See generally UsedSoft GmbH, 2012 E.C.R. 
174. See id. at para. 85-88. 
175. Id. at para. 8, 84. 
176. Daugherty v. Comm’r, 63 F.2d 77, 79 (9th Cir. 1933). See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930) 
(“tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements” no matter how skillfully devised or crafted a 
contract). See also Luce v. Burnet, 55 F.2d 751, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1932). 
177. Reese, supra note 2, at 645-46. 
178. See id.; see supra Part I. 
179. See generally UsedSoft GmbH, 2012 E.C.R.  
180. See Reese, supra note 2, at 645-46.  
181. See supra Part I. 
182. See UsedSoft GmbH, 2012 E.C.R. at para. 8. 
183. Id. at para. 101(1).  
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B. The First Sale Doctrine Policy Rationale 
Adopting a multi-factor test to determine if sales are in fact leases or 
transfers of ownership allows the first sale doctrine to alleviate problems of the 
current legal structure.184 In the digital realm, the first sale doctrine would allow 
products to be more affordable to the public and help to ensure that works of 
authorship remain available to the public over time.185 The right to transfer is vital 
for efficiency because it ensures that property is devoted to its most valuable 
use.186 
From its inception,187 the first sale doctrine’s goal was to limit the statutorily 
created monopolies granted to copyright owners.188 Today, the first sale doctrine 
promotes access to knowledge by preserving physical works that would 
otherwise be discarded, abandoned, or destroyed to ensure lower market supply 
and higher economic gains by sellers.189 An average book has a print life within 
twelve months of initial release190 and software has an even shorter retail life.191 
The first sale doctrine allows these works to not only survive past their shelf life, 
but also to thrive.192 
As stated above, ownership is the main requirement to enact the first sale 
doctrine.193 Since the current practices under contracts of adhesion prevent the 
transfer of ownership, the first sale doctrine cannot be introduced as a defense.194 
This is in stark contrast to the congressional history of the first sale doctrine, 
favoring copyright to coincide with first sale and, even more, Congress’ recent 
enactment of the essential step defense that gives digital works greater protection 
under the first sale doctrine.195 
  
 
184. See supra Part I. 
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195. See supra Part II. 
07_RICHARDSON.EICREVIEW.FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2014 5:20 PM 
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 27 
171 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Today’s digital property transactions resemble a feudal system in which the 
digital copyright owner is able to dictate the terms and overall use of the property 
to the end user through use of contracts of adhesion.196 The United States needs a 
unified scheme to replace the current copyright and contract system that protects 
not only distributors, but end users as well, and that takes into account all of 
digital property’s unique features and facets.197 U.S. courts should treat digital 
property as such and prevent contracts of adhesion from disenfranchising 
consumers from ownership.198 
The most viable avenue for achieving this goal is to introduce the first sale 
doctrine into digital property transactions that resemble real world sales, thereby 




196. See supra Part III. 
197. See Yeh, supra note 5, at 355-56. 
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